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Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000900070038-0

OCB

INFO BRIEFING

6 March 1958

RYUKYU ISLANDS (OKINAWA)

- I. Under article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 the US exercised all powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction.
 - A. In the treaty, Japan agreed to concur in any US proposal to place the islands under UN trusteeship, but in absence such a proposal the US now governs the islands.
 - B. Japan's residual sovereignty was recognized at San Francisco Peace Conference and in subsequent US policy statements.
 1. In 1953, Amami Oshima (Northern Ryukyus) were returned to Japan.
- II. Japan renounced rights to the Kurils and South Sakhalin in article 2 of treaty.
 - A. However, the treaty does not recognize Soviet sovereignty over these islands.
 - B. Thus, future of sovereignty over Kurils to be determined by negotiation.
 - C. The US maintains the two Southern Kuril islands should revert to Japan.
 - D. In peace treaty negotiations during 1953 and 1956 the USSR offered return Shikotan and the Habomai islands to Japan but not Southern Kurils.
- III. Administration of the Ryukyus, is based on Executive Order issued 5 June 1957, which provides for a unicameral legislature of 29 members directly elected every two years.
 - A. Legislature empowered to enact only domestic legislation.

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- B. It has usual power to set rules, judge qualifications of members, establish procedures.
- C. US appointed Ryukyuan chief executive can veto legislative bills.
1. Legislature can override veto by two-thirds vote. US High Commissioner then reviews bill and may use veto.
- IV. US High Commissioner exercises full and complete authority over the Ryukyus when mandatory for security reasons.
- A. He can promulgate laws, ordinances or regulations, veto any law, and remove any official, as in the case of Mayor Uenaga of Naha.
- V. Political parties in the Ryukyus range from the conservative Ryukyu Democratic Party, through the moderate left-of-center Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, to the pro-Communist ^{is a front for} Liaison Council for the Protection of Democracy (LCPD), which absorbed the Okinawa Peoples Party.
- A. In the 1956 election for the legislature there were 390,000 eligible voters and 253,066 votes were cast (total population 822,000).
1. Results were:
- | <u>Party</u> | <u>Votes</u> | <u>Seats</u> | <u>Percent of Vote</u> |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|------------------------|
| Ryukyu Democratic | 119,678 | 17 | 47 |
| Okinawa Socialist Masses | 74,072 | 7 | 29 |
| Okinawa Peoples | 15,066 | 1 | 6 |
| Independent | 41,359 | 4 | 16 |

VI. Elections in Naha, capital of Okinawa in years 1956 through 1958 have shown growing leftist trend.

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A 2. Pro-Communist Renaga backed by Okinawa Peoples Party elected as mayor in 1956.

1. (a) Leftist victories resulted from: exploitation of discontent with US land acquisition and compensation policies, nationalistic sentiment for reversion to Japan.

B, 2. LDPS emerged as a union of extreme socialists and the Peoples Party, which controls it.

1. (a) This grouping camouflages Communist ties, and will probably attract some protest votes from the Socialists. 25X1

VII.

VII. The Japanese Government officially accepts the present status of the Ryukyu--United States control and Japanese residual sovereignty.

A. The Japanese government attempts to interject itself in Okinawa affairs by representation on such matters as the land problem, transfer of Japanese property, etc.

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B. Japanese are privately pressing for administrative control with US retention of base rights as maximum demand; as minimum they desire control of education.

C. Japanese Socialists publicly demand return of Ryukyu to embarrass Kishi.

1. This forces Kishi to take public positions on Okinawa in opposition to US policies, and publicly to press for Japanese administrative rights.

IX.
VIII. Election forecast difficult since campaign only 10 days old.

A. Conservative prospects appear favorable in countryside where traditional loyalties still are strong.

1. Efforts by the Ryukyu Democrats and moderate socialists to cooperate in combining on candidates may restrict leftist gains.

B. Leftists under the banner of the LCPD appear likely to gain seats in the Naha area.

C. [redacted] the Democratic Party

probably will lose its majority in the legislature and that the leftists will gain seats--increasing their representation from one to seven (out of 29)--but independents of varying loyalties will hold the balance of power.

D. In any event, every candidate and party is likely to eschew identification with the US administration and in varying degrees criticize the American authorities.

E. Lt. Gen. Moore, US High Commissioner, is deeply concerned over a possible threat to US security interests posed by the leftist trend on Okinawa.

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